Letting the Finite Vanish: Hegel, Tillich, and Caputo on the Ontological Philosophy of Religion* by 
 [CONCEPT, Vol. XXXVIII (2015)] 
 
Letting the Finite Vanish: Hegel, Tillich, and 
Caputo on the Ontological Philosophy of Religion 
 
Jacob Given 
Theology and Religious Studies 
 
In general, Kant’s critique of metaphysics still holds up, especially for religious 
metaphysics. Most metaphysical arguments rest on indemonstrable assumptions. 
The cosmological argument for the existence of God assumes that matter is 
created, and that an outside force must cause it to come into existence. However, if 
we assume that matter is eternal, then no such unmoved mover is necessary and we 
may argue for atheism. For every theistic argument, there is an equally convincing 
(or unconvincing) atheistic one. This situation does not necessarily debunk the 
truth of either position, but it has produced, as Jean-François Lyotard suggests, a 
“postmodern condition” defined by incredulity toward metanarratives. In other 
words, metaphysics has lost its appeal; apologetic arguments no longer sway us.  
I argue that the ontological philosophy of religion (in the Tillichian sense) is 
an interesting and productive avenue for current philosophy of religion in that it 
does not rely on the sort of metaphysical argumentation that so often ends in 
stalemate – though this does not preclude religious truth claims. Rather, we must 
reimagine religious truth and work at understanding the status of our confessions in 
the context of a hermeneutic phenomenology. We must recognize that 
interpretation goes all the way down, and that our faith is not assured in any 
modernist metaphysical sense. Drawing primarily from Paul Tillich and Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, I will examine the ontological methodology as it is 
employed in the current debate surrounding religion with or without religion.1 As 
philosophy of religion becomes more oriented toward phenomenology, our 
metaphysical beliefs will gain more existential traction. 
 
The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion 
 
In “The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion,” Tillich lays out two modes of 
approaching God: (1) ontological philosophy of religion and (2) cosmological 
philosophy of religion. Tillich characterizes the distinction between the two 
                                                
1 This concept of “religion without religion” is addressed below in section 2. 
 approaches as the difference between overcoming estrangement versus meeting a 
stranger. In the first instance, we find something from which we have never been 
apart; we simply need it brought to our attention. “In the first way man discovers 
himself when he discovers God; he discovers something that is identical with 
himself although it transcends him infinitely, something from which he is 
estranged, but from which he never has been and never can be separated.”2 Tillich 
here highlights humankind’s immediate and transcendental awareness of the divine 
as inextricably caught up in Being. In recognizing that existence is situated in the 
divine, humanity can overcome estrangement. In the second instance, we search 
for something unknown that exists apart from us, some object “over yonder” as 
Hegel put it. 
 
In the second way man meets a stranger when he meets God. The meeting is 
accidental. Essentially they do not belong to each other. They may become 
friends on a tentative and conjectural basis. But there is no certainty about 
the stranger man has met. He may disappear, and only probable statements 
can be made about his nature.3 
 
This notion of God is qualitatively different from the first in that God is cut off 
from Being-as-such, and becomes just one being among others. These two 
methodologies, “ontological” in the first instance and “cosmological” in the 
second, represent distinct types of philosophy of religion. The essential task of the 
philosopher of religion is to characterize the relationship between the two 
absolutes: Being and God. 
Tillich describes the ontological methodology as “the Augustinian solution.” 
Deus, God, and esse, Being, coincide in veritas, truth. This idea of truth is 
presupposed any time we ask a question. Even if we deny truth itself, we must do 
so in the name of truth. When Augustine identifies God with truth, he makes God 
into the presupposition of the question of God. In order to inquire about the 
existence of God or the nature of God, we must presuppose that God is, in some 
sense, as the condition for the possibility of all being, all knowledge, and all 
discourse. “This is the ontological solution to the problem of the philosophy of 
religion. God can never be reached if he is the object of a question, and not its 
basis.”4 Deus est esse, God is Being. 
This “Augustinian Solution,” then, is countered by “The Thomistic 
Dissolution.” This methodology does away with Augustine’s key insight and 
                                                
2 Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, (New York: Oxford University Press 1978), 10. 
3 Ibid., 10. 
4 Ibid., 13. 
 instead turns to a sense-based epistemology that requires the mediation of 
argumentative rationality. Instead of an immediate knowledge of God, as in the 
ontological approach, Aquinas relies on observing the “effects” of God in order to 
demonstrate what God is. Tillich observes: 
 
Aquinas cuts the nerve of the ontological approach. Man is excluded from 
the primum esse and the prima veritas. It is impossible for him to adhere to 
the uncreated truth. For the principles, the trascendentalia, are not the 
presence of the divine in us, they are not the “uncreated light” through which 
we see everything, but they are the created structure of our mind. It is 
obvious that in this way the immediate knowledge of the Absolute is 
destroyed. Sapientia, the knowledge of the principles, is qualitatively not 
different from scientia.5 
 
So, for Tillich, Aquinas seeks to prove God as the highest being on the basis of 
observing the cosmos. “This is the final outcome of the Thomistic dissolution to 
the Augustinian solution. The question of the two Ultimates is answered in such a 
way that the religious Absolute has become a singular being of overwhelming 
power, while the philosophical Absolute is formalized into a given structure of 
reality in which everything is contingent and individual.” 6  In divorcing the 
concepts of God and Being, the cosmological methodology makes God an 
unreachable and unknowable stranger.7 
 A sketch of Hegel’s distinction between Reason and understanding will here 
deepen our analysis of Tillich and provide a context for current debates concerning 
the practice of philosophy of religion. Here I turn to Hegel’s Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion. Hegel’s distinction between Reason [Vernunft] and 
understanding [Verstand] is roughly parallel to Tillich’s division between the 
ontological and cosmological philosophies of religion. Critical of the metaphysical 
proofs of God’s existence (the existence of an unknowable stranger, in Tillich’s 
                                                
5 Ibid., 17. 
6 Ibid., 19. 
7 I want to be careful to add that Tillich gives us a brief and uncharitable read of St. Thomas. 
This is partly due to his attempt to make two neat, compartmentalized approaches to the 
philosophy of religion in such a short essay. In order to create such a stark divide between the 
two approaches in an economic way, he needs Augustine to play the hero and Aquinas to play 
the villain. However, as Caputo points out in Heidegger and Aquinas, Thomas has a negative 
theology at the core of the Summa. Nonetheless, Tillich’s characterization of the cosmological 
approach to the philosophy of religion is not altogether wrong. Many neo-scholastics and 
Thomists have bought into this scheme completely. Even worse, many protestant apologists have 
issued textbook cosmological arguments in Aquinas’ name. So, while I do want to give St. 
Thomas some kind of break, I certainly do not want to excuse the entire Thomistic tradition. 
 terminology), Hegel points out the absurdity of trying to prove the infinite God as 
if God were an object among objects. The result of the proofs for God’s existence 
is that God becomes something less than God: 
 
In the proofs it is argued that, because the finite is, for that reason the infinite 
is, too. What is expressed here, therefore, is that the finite is; this is the point 
of departure, the foundation. From this arises the objection against these 
proofs that they are said to make the finite into the foundation for the being 
of God. The finite is an abiding point of departure, and in this procedure the 
being of God is mediated through the being of the finite … For the 
understanding there are, in the mediation, two actual beings: on this side 
there is a world and over yonder there is God, and the knowledge of the 
world is the foundation of the being of God.8 
 
This, it seems, is his summation of the cosmological methodology. Hegel points 
out that, for the cosmological philosophers, the rational way to God is through 
deducing the infinite from the finite. Yet the methodology self-destructs in that it 
makes God into a finite being “over yonder,” alongside the world, because it 
supposes that the world itself has its own, self-contained, autonomous being. This 
is how the understanding [Verstand] works. It deals in positive, measurable, atomic 
concepts which all rest on the same plane. You have the world, and you have God 
– “over yonder” – the object. 
 Alternatively, Hegel suggests that we understand finitude only as a limit, and 
not as pointing toward being. As he says, “the finite element has no truth, and 
reason [Vernunft] is precisely the insight that the finite is only a limit.” Here he 
sets up the secondary and derivative nature of the merely finite. Finitude is merely 
a visible demarcation, a rendering intelligible of invisible infinity. The next 
sentence contains the magic of Hegel’s approach: “But inasmuch as we know 
something as a limit, we are already beyond it.”9 This knowledge of limitation, this 
Reason [Vernunft], is precisely the direction toward the knowledge of God.  
To know the finite as finitude is to become aware of the underlying infinity, 
to open one’s self up to it, to become exposed dialectically. One could say that 
Hegel’s approach is not so much an attempt to grasp God as it is an attempt to 
understand ourselves as always already grasped by God. Hegelian philosophy of 
religion, then, understands through Reason [Vernunft] the underlying infinity that 
is the unity of all finitude. It might be close to something like pantheism or 
                                                
8 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, (Berkeley: University of California Press 1988), 
171-172. I supplied the German parenthetical. 
9 Hegel, 173. 
 panentheism if taken metaphysically. If taken onto-phenomenologically, however, 
as in the vein of Heidegger, this sort of underlying infinity can be seen as Being 
itself, that unintelligible principle by which existing things are themselves 
intelligible. In the metaphysical interpretation, Hegel is telling us something about 
the world itself. In the onto-phenomenological interpretation, Hegel is giving us a 
phenomenological methodology for reaching awareness of God through Vernunft 
as the condition for our own existence. It is this methodological insight that Tillich 
notices in “The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion.”10 
The distinction between ontological and cosmological philosophy of religion 
is clear, then. In the ontological approach to philosophy of religion, we overcome 
estrangement to realize the depth of the existence that we experience every day. 
God is Being, intuitively grasped as the ineffable condition for the possibility of all 
existence and knowledge. In the cosmological approach, we search for a stranger, 
an elusive object that is unlike anything with which we are familiar. God is only 
one being alongside many, although it happens that God is incredibly powerful. 
Further, we are not immediately acquainted with God. In the ontological approach, 
God is already present. In the cosmological approach, God is hiding among other 
objects in the world. The ontological approach is immediate, finding God beneath 
the self and overcoming estrangement from the ground of our being. The 
cosmological approach is mediated, using argument and observation to search for 
God the stranger. 
 
Reframing the Problem: Post-Kantian and Post-Hegelian Philosophy of 
Religion 
 
The distinctions discussed above are valuable in sorting out the contemporary 
debates in continental philosophy of religion. There is some sort of radicalism 
inherent in all postmodern thought, usually in the form of an admission of the 
historical nature of reason and situation of the human person. Often seen as the 
contemporary radical theologian, John Caputo argues for religion without religion, 
                                                
10 Here I should note a difference between Tillich’s and Kant’s use of the term “ontological.” 
The original nomenclature for the “ontological argument” comes from Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason. For Kant, the term “ontological” means precisely that the existence of a supreme cause 
is concluded from a priori conceptions alone. There is a move from concepts to Deity, highest 
being. (See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason [Rutland: Charles E. Tuttle Co. 1991] 346.) This is, of 
course, very different from Tillich’s intention in employing the word “ontological.” For Tillich, 
in an ontological approach “man discovers himself when he discovers God; he discovers 
something that is identical with himself although it transcends him infinitely, something from 
which he is estranged, but from which he never has been and never can be separated,” (Tillich, 
10).  
 a content-less religious form of life, religiousness as such. This religion without 
religion, informed by Derrida and deconstruction, seeks to do away with religious 
determinacy in order to remain open to the event of God. There is an essential 
question that needs to be asked: is Caputo actually advocating a negation of 
particular metaphysical claims, or is he offering a hermeneutic-phenomenological 
description of religiosity? This is a point of intense debate in the continental 
philosophy of religion. 
J. Aaron Simmons and Stephen Minister edited a compilation of essays 
questioning the necessity of religion without religion, entitled Reexamining 
Deconstruction and Determinate Religion: Toward a Religion with Religion. The 
concluding paragraph in Westphal’s penultimate chapter of the compilation sums 
up the thrust of the argument:  
 
It seems to me that the option of religion without religion is just that, an 
option, a choice, a decision— as risky as the option of religion with (some 
particular) religion. For postmodern and deconstructive analyses, the limits 
of human insight and language simply do not require that our religion, if it 
be that, be without religion. Our theories do not make our choices for us, nor 
do they provide the kind of guarantees we would like. That is what 
modernity failed to understand.11 
 
Here, Westphal seems to buy into the undecidability of the truth of particular 
religious traditions, and counts religion without religion as one more option, one 
more choice which we make. This choice is an either/or for Westphal. Either you 
go along with Derrida and Caputo or you buy into the creeds of a particular 
tradition. This either/or is characteristic of Verstand, but I want to suspend our 
either/or judgments for the moment in order to recognize the underlying unity. To 
see the limits of the understanding as precisely that, as limits, and to let the 
understanding vanish, for however short a time, in order to properly orient our 
understanding within Hegelian Vernunft.  
 Simmons and Minister opted to give Caputo the last word in their volume. 
His essay, entitled “On Not Settling for an Abridged Edition of Postmodernism: 
Radical Hermeneutics as Radical Theology,” addresses the division between post-
Kantian and post-Hegelian philosophy of religion. The post-Kantian strain 
represents most of the contributors to the volume, including Westphal, while 
Caputo claims that his project is post-Hegelian. He states:  
                                                
11 Merold Westphal, “Conversations on Religion With or Without Religion,” in Deconstruction 
and Determinate Religion Reexamined, eds. J. Aaron Simmons and Stephen Minister 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2012), 270. 
  
The overarching difference between the other contributors and me can be 
seen as a debate between a postmodernism that descends from Kant and a 
postmodernism that descends from Hegel … I think that it is a strategy they 
have come up with for limiting the exposure of Christian faith to postmodern 
analysis and that postmodernism interprets Christianity more holistically and 
comprehensively by treating religion as an historical form of life … the 
result of my analysis is to make it a good deal more unsafe than theirs. They 
start out by asking, “How is faith possible in the postmodern situation?” I 
begin by asking, “What is the human condition?,” to which faith like 
everything else is irrecusably subject . . . . The Kantian model results in an 
apologetics, not a classical-modern version but an updated postmodern one . 
. . . The Hegelian model, however, does not issue in apologetics but in a 
theology of the event that feels around for the underlying experiences to 
which concrete religious traditions give form and figure, nomination and 
actualization.12 
 
The post-Kantian model of philosophy of religion only deals in atomic facts, in 
Verstand, which, at its worst, renders a rather flat model of religion-as-beliefs, and 
epistemology as the only field for philosophy of religion. For Caputo, post-Kantian 
philosophy of religion deals with delimiting knowledge in order to make room for 
faith. The post-Hegelian route that Caputo takes, however, utilizes Vernunft to get 
at the event, the underlying we-know-not-what past the limit of understanding, the 
infinite, that which nothing greater can be thought. Of course, we do not get at it 
directly or positively, but only by letting Verstand fall in an act of negation. This is 
the idea of religion without religion: the position and negation of religion to let the 
infinite stuff of religion loose. 
 In my estimation, religion without religion functions well as phenomenology 
of religion, calling into question the finality of determinate creeds without 
completely abandoning them. Westphal’s essential mistake, then, is to make these 
two positions, creedal religion and deconstructed religion, mutually exclusive, to 
make an “either/or” out of a “both/and.” Christianity, for example, stands in 
contrast to a simple negation like atheism. If both positions make exclusive truth 
claims, then there really is an either/or present and there really is a decision to be 
made. But this either/or rests on Verstand. Religion without religion does not 
                                                
12 John Caputo, “On Not Settling for an Abridged Edition of Postmodernism: Radical 
Hermeneutics as Radical Theology,” in Deconstruction and Determinate Religion Reexamined 
eds. J. Aaron Simmons and Stephen Minister (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press 2012), 271-
272.  
 
 dispose of Christianity, but pushes beyond the edges of the finite in order to get at 
the infinite stuff of Christianity. This deeper probing into religion, on the edges of 
infinity, does not invalidate or do away with religion necessarily. Rather it deepens 
and accounts for the determinate position. There is no either/or between 
deconstructive religion without religion on the one hand, and determinate religion 
on the other. Religion without religion functions at a different, onto-
phenomenological level. This makes it qualitatively distinct from the belief 
systems and dogmatic structures of determinate religion. There can be no either/or. 
 
Conclusion: Toward a Post-Hegelian, Ontological Philosophy of Religion with 
Religion 
 
The task of the religious individual is to overcome estrangement, requiring a 
Vernunft which is present in the recognition of a limit as a limit. Ontological 
philosophers of religion will use this post-Hegelian ontological philosophy to 
describe the religious experience in a hermeneutic phenomenology. This 
description will deepen and enliven our religious confessions. In our pursuit of 
religious truth, we will begin to seek the event harbored in the name of God that 
sustains us, which lies underneath the name of God itself. We will employ 
Vernunft in order to give depth to our Verstand; we will work out our doctrine for 
the sake of our ultimate concern. Philosophers of religion will not treat doctrine 
apart from inward existential deepening, the two go hand in hand. In meeting God 
as that which is immanent yet infinitely transcendent of us, we will work out our 
understandings to facilitate this event. The event harbored in the name of God will 
prevent dogmatic confession from becoming an end in itself, but will nonetheless 
bring new life to our Verstand. Like Kierkegaard, ontological philosophers will 
delve into the religious infinite in order to return to the universal with a deeper 
awareness of just what it is we are doing here. In letting the finite vanish, we can 
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